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Abstract 
Higher-beta and higher-volatility equities do not earn commensurately higher returns, a pattern 
known as the risk anomaly. In this paper, we consider the possibility that the risk anomaly 
represents mispricing and develop its implications for corporate leverage. The risk anomaly 
generates a simple tradeoff theory: At zero leverage, the overall cost of capital falls as leverage 
increases equity risk, but as debt becomes riskier the marginal benefit of increasing equity risk 
declines. We show that there is an interior optimum and that it is reached at lower leverage for 
firms with high asset risk. Empirically, the risk anomaly tradeoff theory and the traditional 
tradeoff theory are both consistent with the finding that firms with low-risk assets choose higher 
leverage. More uniquely, the risk anomaly theory helps to explain why leverage is inversely 
related to systematic risk, holding constant total risk; why leverage is inversely related to upside 
risk, not just downside risk; why numerous firms maintain low or zero leverage despite high 
marginal tax rates; and, why other firms maintain high leverage despite little tax benefit. 
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I. Introduction 
According to traditional capital structure theory, adding leverage increases the risk and 
cost of equity but, in the absence of other frictions, does not change the overall weighted average 
cost of capital. As long as equity and debt markets are integrated, and therefore price risk the 
same way, the division of risk between equity and debt is irrelevant.  
Empirical research in asset pricing has called into question how the stock market, in 
particular, prices risk and return. For example, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) predicts 
that the expected return on a security is proportional to its systematic risk, i.e., market beta. The 
“risk anomaly” is the empirical pattern that stocks with higher beta or volatility have tended to 
earn lower returns, not higher returns, both on a risk-adjusted basis and sometimes even on an 
unadjusted basis. Put simply, the fundamental risk-return relationship in the stock market has 
historically been flat, if not inverted.  
The risk anomaly was originally put forth in the 1970s and is now the subject of a 
burgeoning empirical and theoretical literature.  Contributions include Fama and French (1992), 
Falkenstein (1994), Ang, Hodrick, Ying, and Zhang (2006), Blitz and van Vliet (2007), Baker, 
Bradley, and Wurgler (2011), and several others. The anomaly appears in long samples, 
including international samples.  A number of these papers consider the findings to be evidence 
of mispricing as opposed to a somewhat backwards misspecification of risk. We do not provide 
another attempt to resolve this issue but rather, in the spirit of Stein (1996), who considers 
rational capital budgeting in the presence of capital market mispricing, we study how capital 
structure should be set in the presence of a risk anomaly.  
The basic idea of the risk anomaly theory of leverage is that firms with relatively low risk 
assets—and hence underpriced equity, all else equal—may want to rely disproportionately on 
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debt to take advantage of the anomaly. We develop and test this idea in three steps. First, we 
measure the risk anomaly in equity and corporate debt returns. Second, we model optimal 
leverage in the presence of the risk anomaly. Third, we return to the data and explore the model’s 
main prediction of an inverse relationship between leverage and systematic risk and test other 
predictions that distinguish it from the standard tradeoff theory. 
We measure the risk anomaly in a large sample of CRSP returns data. Consistent with 
prior results, a one-unit increase in equity beta is associated with lower beta-adjusted stock 
returns – that is, lower realized cost of equity – of around 5% per year. But because capital 
structure irrelevance depends on market integration, not a rational tradeoff between risk and 
return, we extend these to confirm that the anomaly, at least in an integrated fashion, does not 
extend to debt markets.  
Our model of optimal leverage illustrates a simple tradeoff. It assumes no frictions other 
than a risk anomaly in equity. This contrasts with traditional tradeoff theories, which generate an 
interior optimum by assuming one friction to limit leverage on the high side and another to limit 
it on the low side. The intuition of the risk anomaly tradeoff is as follows. Under the anomaly, 
risk is overvalued in equity but not in debt.2 Ideally, then, to minimize the cost of capital, the 
firm concentrates risk in equity. A firm will always want to issue as much riskless debt as it can. 
This lowers the cost of equity by increasing its risk without any “inefficient” transfer of risk to 
debt. But, as debt becomes risky, further increases in leverage have a cost. Shifting overvalued 
risk in equity securities to fairly valued risk, or simply less overvalued risk, in debt increases the 
cost of capital. For firms with high-risk assets, this cost is high even at low levels of leverage. 
For firms with very low risk assets, this cost remains low until leverage is high. We prove that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This is for convenience. The intuition and qualitative results would be identical if the risk anomaly is merely 
weaker in debt markets. 	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there is an interior optimum leverage ratio that is inversely related to asset beta. Calibrations 
using the empirical size of the anomaly suggest that the value gains from exploiting the tradeoff 
appropriately, or the losses from not doing so, can be substantial. 
We find strong empirical support for the main prediction that leverage is inversely related 
to asset beta. We start with a firm-specific measure of asset beta, but to avoid the mechanical 
negative link between leverage and the firm’s asset beta that arises from unlevering its equity 
beta we conduct most of the analysis with industry asset beta. The explanatory power of asset 
risk variables is largely separate from the explanatory power of profitability, asset tangibility, 
market-to-book assets, size, and marginal tax rates. 
Clearly, the risk-leverage prediction overlaps with a central prediction of the traditional 
tradeoff theory with financial distress costs, including dynamic generalizations implicating asset 
beta such as Schwert and Strebulaev (2014), so neither approach can claim immediate credit for 
this empirical result. We turn to other aspects of the data to establish at least an incremental role 
for the risk anomaly theory.  
For starters, a prominent shortcoming of the traditional tradeoff theory is the low-
leverage puzzle. Graham (2000) and others have pointed out that hundreds of profitable firms, 
with high marginal tax rates, maintain literally zero leverage. Conversely, a number of other 
profitable firms maintain quite high leverage despite no tax benefit. The traditional tradeoff 
theory has difficulty with these facts, but the inverse relationship between risk and leverage 
suggests how the risk anomaly tradeoff could help. If low leverage firms find that the tax benefit 
of debt is less than the opportunity cost of transferring risk to lower-cost equity, low leverage 
may be optimal even in the presence of additional frictions; a minor transaction cost of issuance 
could drive some firms to zero leverage. Meanwhile, low asset risk firms with no tax benefits of 
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debt still need a substantial amount of it to take advantage of the anomaly. Hence, while it is not 
immediately apparent which theory explains the middle range of leverage—a reasonable position 
is that both are at play—the extremes are more easily accommodated by the risk anomaly theory.  
Increasingly complex variants of the traditional theory also have trouble explaining some 
results. For example, optimal leverage may depend inversely on systematic risk because higher 
asset beta, all else equal, reflects the market state and increases in the present value of the costs 
of financial distress when it is likelier to occur. Almeida and Philippon (2007) make this general 
argument, while Shleifer and Vishny (1992) suggest clustered asset fire sales as a mechanism. 
This explanation has an empirical weakness and a more fundamental conceptual weakness.  
The empirical weakness is that the cost or risks of financial distress is a “downside” risk. 
If this is what is limiting leverage for high asset risk firms, we would expect “downside beta,” 
not “upside beta,” to drive the negative leverage-risk relationship. Under the risk anomaly 
theory, in contrast, upside beta is just as relevant. And, empirically, we find that upside beta is, if 
anything, the stronger empirical link to leverage.  
The conceptual weakness is that the traditional tradeoff theory, with rational asset 
pricing, cannot explain both the notion that systematic risk measured by beta increases the 
present value of the costs of financial distress and the asset pricing evidence that systematic risk 
measured by beta is not priced. It seems highly desirable to have a single paradigm to explain 
both asset pricing facts and leverage patterns, and the risk anomaly tradeoff offers one. 
Section II reviews the literature on the risk anomaly and measures it in our data. Section 
III presents a model of optimal leverage under a risk anomaly. Section IV contains empirical 
tests. Section V concludes.  
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II. The Risk Anomaly 
In this section we give some background on the anomaly and then estimate its size in our 
own data. Based on a broad view of the evidence, the anomaly is a sufficiently robust pattern to 
justify an exploration of its normative implications for capital structure. 
 
A.  Background 
Over the long run, riskier asset classes have earned higher returns in U.S. markets. Small 
stocks have outperformed large caps, which have outperformed corporate bonds, which have 
outperformed long-term Treasuries, and so on (Ibbotson Associates (2012)). Our interest, 
however, is the evidence that the historical risk-return tradeoff within the stock market is flat or 
inverted. While the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) predicts that the expected return on a 
security is proportional to its systematic risk (beta), stocks with higher beta (or idiosyncratic risk) 
have tended to earn lower returns, particularly on a risk-adjusted basis.  
The risk anomaly is present across stock markets and sample periods. Black (1972), 
Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), Haugen and Heins (1975), and Fama and French (1992) 
noted the relatively flat relationship between expected returns and beta in the U.S. Subsequently, 
Falkenstein (1994) and Ang, Hodrick, Ying, and Zhang (2006) have emphasized the magnitude 
and robustness of the anomaly. Blitz and van Vliet (2007), Ang et al. (2009), and Baker, Bradley, 
and Taliaferro (2013) confirm its presence within developed markets and Blitz, Pang, and van 
Vliet (2013) document it in emerging markets.  
The magnitude of the anomaly is substantial. Baker, Bradley, and Taliaferro (2013) find 
that a dollar invested in a low quintile beta portfolio of U.S. stocks in early 1968 grows to $70.50 
by the end of 2011, a while dollar invested in a high beta portfolio grows only to $7.61. In a 
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sample of up to 30 developed equity markets over a shorter period beginning in 1989, these 
figures are $6.40 and $0.99. We estimate the anomaly’s size in more useful units below. 
Several explanations for the anomaly have been developed. Investors may have an 
irrational preference for volatile or skewed investments, due to overconfidence, as in Cornell 
(2008), or lottery preferences, as in Kumar (2009), Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) and 
Barberis and Huang (2008). Other investors may simply categorize stocks together and neglect to 
price differences in risk, as in Barberis and Shleifer (2003). Leverage-constrained investors who 
seek maximum returns from beta risk must buy high beta stocks directly as opposed to forming a 
levered portfolio of low beta stocks (Black (1972) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)).  
Moreover, sophisticated investors may have trouble exploiting and eliminating the 
anomaly. Fund managers may prefer high-beta assets themselves because the inflows to 
performing well are greater than the outflows to performing poorly (Karceski (2002)) or because 
they are rewarded for beating the market, which presumably has a positive risk premium, on a 
non-beta-adjusted basis (Brennan (1993) and Baker et al. (2011)). More generally, short-selling 
constraints inhibit sophisticated investors’ ability to exploit an overpricing of high-beta stocks 
(Hong and Sraer (2012)).  
A relatively open question is the existence or size of a similar anomaly in debt markets. 
As we discuss below, this is important for corporate finance implications. The most recent 
evidence is Houweling, van Vliet, Wang, and Beekhuizen (2014), who find that short-maturity 
corporate bonds issued by low risk firms have slightly higher beta-risk-adjusted returns. A 
significant difference for our purpose is that their betas are with respect to the corporate bond 
market. Fama and French (1993) report that stock market betas are practically identical for bond 
portfolios of various ratings and conclude that different risk factors describe returns in the stock 
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and bond markets, i.e., the markets are not integrated. Baele, Bekaert, and Inghelbrecht (2009) 
find that the magnitude and even the sign of the correlation between stock index and government 
bond returns are highly unstable. Nonetheless, we are not aware of a formal test for an integrated 
risk anomaly, so we conduct a simple one. 
The risk anomaly challenges not just the CAPM—a convenient but not strictly necessary 
assumption of traditional capital structure theory—but any framework where risk and expected 
return are positively related. There is, of course, a vast literature in asset pricing that aims to 
identify measures of risk that perform better than beta, with the implicit notion that beta is not a 
meaningful risk to the representative investor. In light of the robust evidence and reasonable 
explanations for the anomaly, however, this paper follows several others and takes the view that 
it reflects inefficient asset pricing, not misspecification of risk.   
B. Measuring the Anomaly 
We focus on estimating the magnitude of the anomaly as an input to later calibrations. 
We also establish that it is primarily an equity market phenomenon.  Should there happen to be 
an identical anomaly across the equity and debt markets, then, as suggested above, the cost of 
capital would vary pathologically with asset risk but in a way that managers could not control 
with financial structure. It is therefore important to rule this out. 
We use a linear specification for risk anomaly in equity  
re = β −1( )γ + rf +βrp  (1) 
and debt 
rd = βd −βd( )γd + rf +βdrp  (2) 
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where rf is the risk free rate, rp is the market risk premium, βd is average debt beta, and γ. <= 0 
measures the size of the anomaly in that market.3 Risk-adjusted expected returns decrease 
linearly with risk: Securities with one additional unit of risk relative to their market average have 
–γ. lower risk-adjusted returns. Otherwise, the CAPM holds.4  
Figure 1 shows three potential scenarios involving low risk anomalies. The light solid 
line shows the theoretical security market line. Panel A illustrates an integrated risk anomaly in 
which γ = γd < 0. While this scenario has investment implications—overinvestment relative to 
the CAPM prediction for firms with high asset beta and vice-versa—it has none for capital 
structure. If the two markets are integrated then the Modigliani-Miller theorem is preserved and 
(with the minor modification that the weighted average of equity and debt betas is one) the cost 
of capital is simply 
WACC = ere + 1− e( )rd = βa −1( )γ + rf +βarp  (3) 
which is independent of the chosen capital structure e. Panel B shows the case of a risk anomaly 
in equities and correctly priced debt. Here, γ  < γd = 0. Panel C shows the case of low risk 
anomalies in both equity and debt with the empirically relevant case of	  γ  < γd < 0 (although there 
is no theoretical reason why the anomaly could not be greater in debt). 
We first estimate the relationship between equity returns and beta using data from 
January 1931 through December 2012 from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) 
data. We include all industries. We compute results for the 45 years (540 months) since January 
1968, when the number of stocks in the beta portfolios becomes large and which approaches the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 These apply to any firm i but we suppress the relevant subscripts on betas and costs of capital. We also suppress 
the subscript e on the equity beta and gamma. 
4 Following typical practice, we will compute betas with respect to the stock market, but conceptually all that 
matters is that we use a common market for equity and debt.	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beginning of our Compustat leverage sample, as well as the full sample of 82 years (984 months) 
since January 1931. We use CRSP value-weighted market returns for CAPM-based analyses and 
add the Fama-French SMB and HML factors for their 3-factor model. We use a minimum of 24 
months and a maximum of 60 months of returns to estimate market betas for each stock, and then 
form value-weighted and equal-weighted bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30% beta portfolios.  
Tables 1 and 2 show the raw returns, factor slopes, and alphas for each portfolio 
weighting, risk-adjustment model, and sample period combination. Figure 2 also plots the alphas 
against CAPM beta. The lack of a meaningful (positive) relationship between risk and return in 
equities is evident.  
In equal weighted portfolios between 1968 and 2012, the average return on low risk 
stocks was 71 basis points per month, versus 81 basis points for the middle risk portfolio and 74 
basis points for the high risk portfolio. On a risk-adjusted basis, the risk anomaly becomes even 
clearer, with a statistically significant CAPM-adjusted difference of 30 basis points per month 
for a spread of 0.74 in market beta. The ratio of the intercept to the market return slope in the 
Top-Bottom column also gives us a rough estimate of γ. In the equal-weighted CAPM 
specification, the estimate is γ = -30/0.74 = 41 basis points, or 5.0% per unit beta lower annual 
cost of equity. By comparison, the market risk premium itself in the Fama-French data is 5.1% in 
the 1968-2012 period and 7.9% in the 1931-2012 period.  
The value-weighted raw returns are monotonically decreasing in risk, at 46 basis points 
for the low risk portfolio, 45 basis points for the middle risk portfolio, and 39 basis points for the 
high risk portfolio. Indeed, the high beta portfolio returns are sufficiently variable that even after 
44 years of mostly rising markets, one cannot reject the hypothesis that their mean is zero. We 
plot these results in Figure 2. 
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the high and low risk portfolios, the intercepts relative to the theoretical security market line 
differ by 39 basis points against a spread of 0.72 in market beta. For the Fama-French three 
factor model these results are the same or stronger. Finally, a Gibbons, Ross, Shanken (1989) test 
for the joint significance of the intercepts rejects the null in all specifications.  
The story since 1931 is similar. The anomaly is not immediately apparent in raw returns, 
although even after 81 years there is no statistically significant difference between the return on 
high and low risk portfolios. The risk-adjusted returns again reveal the anomaly. As before, there 
is an even stronger risk anomaly with respect to the Fama-French model, apparently from netting 
out the prominent small cap (SMB) and value (HML) effects in the high beta portfolio. 
We next look for a corresponding debt market anomaly. We compute an alpha and beta 
for long-term corporate and government bonds using data from Ibbotson Associates. We report 
these in Table 3 and plot them alongside the equity portfolios in Figure 2. There are two 
immediate observations from the figure. First, the corporate bond data points fall well below the 
extended security market line computed from the equity market in both samples. Second, while 
the corporate bond returns still fall above the theoretical security market line, this appears to be 
entirely due to a term premium in both government and corporate bonds. 
Table 3 tests more formally for an integrated anomaly. Using the difference in point 
estimates between the low risk and high risk stock portfolios, alpha should rise by 54 basis points 
(-39.0/0.72) for each unit reduction in beta. Hence, the simple alpha of the corporate bond 
portfolio, with a beta that is 0.51 lower, ‘should be’ 27.5 basis points higher than the alpha of the 
low risk portfolio. The actual alpha of 5.1 falls 22.4 basis points short of this integrated markets 
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target. The actual and extrapolated alphas are far enough apart that we can reject integration at 
roughly a 10% level.5  
A portion of the return on corporate bonds during this period reflects falling inflation, not 
an integrated anomaly. With this in mind, we also control for the term premium on government 
bonds in the second panel. Baker and Wurgler (2013) find that there is a statistically strong link 
between bond returns and the cross-section of stock returns. The low risk stock portfolio is much 
more exposed to government bond returns than is the high risk stock portfolio. This turns out to 
explain only a small portion of the risk anomaly in stocks, however. By contrast, exposure to 
government bond returns explains the entire alpha on corporate bonds. The alpha on corporate 
bonds is now 9.8 basis points lower than the low risk stock portfolio, while it ‘should be’ 23.3 
basis points higher. The gap of 33.1 basis points is highly statistically significant. Over the full 
history, when the performance of government bonds was more modest, we reject integration 
even more strongly.  
In short, while there is a link between government bonds and low risk stocks, there is 
otherwise little evidence of a common risk anomaly across debt and equity markets. This means 
reducing the risk of corporate equity by substituting equity for corporate bonds would not have 
left the overall cost of capital unchanged. Put in terms of Figure 1, the data are most consistent 
with Panel B or perhaps Panel C with a modest risk anomaly in debt markets. As these two cases 
have qualitatively similar conclusions for optimal capital structure, we will assume that debt is 
correctly priced in the model.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 To compute a p-value we draw from a multivariate normal distribution using the OLS estimates and covariances 
for the coefficients in the first three columns. For each of 10,000 draws, we compare the actual and extrapolated 
alpha. A one-tailed p-value of 0.095, for example, indicates that approximately 950 of the random draws feature an 
actual alpha that is higher than the extrapolated alpha. 
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III.  The Risk Anomaly and Leverage  
This section outlines a static model of optimal capital structure with no frictions other 
than a risk anomaly in equity. There are no taxes, transaction costs, issuance costs, incentive or 
information effects of leverage, or costs of financial distress or bankruptcy. Unlike other tradeoff 
models, which require one tradeoff to limit leverage on the low side and another to limit it on the 
high side, this single mechanism drives an interior optimum. The central prediction we are 
working toward is that firms with high asset beta will prefer low leverage; the natural benefit 
they acquire from the low beta anomaly deteriorates quickly with leverage, while low beta firms 
will pursue high leverage in order to better capture it. 
 We discuss this prediction in more detail at the end of this section as a lead-in to the 
empirical work. We hypothesize that the risk anomaly mechanism contributes explanatory power 
to the cross-section of leverage both within the normal range and in the extremes that highlight 
some shortcomings of the standard tradeoff model: namely, the hundreds of firms that maintain 
zero or almost zero debt despite clear tax benefits and ability to pay, and the numerous other 
firms that maintain high debt despite low or zero marginal tax rates. 
A. A Risk Anomaly Tradeoff Theory 
The main assumption is the existence of a linear anomaly in equity and no anomaly in 
debt, i.e., roughly consistent with our previous empirical results. This is the case of Panel B in 
Figure 1 and corresponds to γ < γd = 0 in terms of Equations (1) and (2). A less important 
assumption is that the CAPM holds up to the risk anomaly in equity, but any model with a 
stronger risk anomaly in equity will lead to the same qualitative conclusions. By assuming 
sufficient conditions for the CAPM to hold in rational markets, we can develop comparative 
statics using the familiar transfers of beta risk from equity to debt as leverage increases. 
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When there is a risk anomaly in equity, so that γ is nonzero, the weighted average cost of 
capital depends not only on asset beta but on leverage: 
WACC(e) = ere + 1− e( )rd = rf +βarp + βa −1( )γ − 1− e( ) 1−βd( )γ , (3) 
where e is the ratio of equity to firm value and debt beta, without any further loss of generality, is 
a function of leverage and the underlying asset risk. The second to last term (the asset beta minus 
one times γ) is the uncontrollable reduction (increase) in the cost of capital that comes from 
having high-risk (low-risk) assets. The last term is the controllable cost of having too little 
leverage. 
The optimal capital structure minimizes this last term, by satisfying the first order 
condition for e. With the further assumption of a differentiable debt beta, for a given level of 
asset beta the optimal capital ratio e* satisfies: 
−γ 1−βd e*(βa ),βa⎡⎣ ⎤⎦+ 1− e*(βa )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
∂βd e*(βa ),βa⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
∂e
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
= 0
 (4)
 
or in terms of optimal debt beta 
β*d e*(βa ),βa⎡⎣ ⎤⎦=1+ 1− e*(βa )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
∂βd e*(βa ),βa⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
∂e .  
Interestingly, the optimum leverage does not depend on the size of the risk anomaly. This is 
somewhat of a technicality, however. If there were other frictions associated with leverage, such 
as taxes or financial distress costs, the anomaly’s size would be relevant. 
Under the assumption of a linear risk anomaly as expressed in Equation (1), the optimum 
leverage will be an interior solution as follows. With zero debt, the asset beta is equal to the 
equity beta and equation (3) reduces to 
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WACC(1) = rf +βarp + βa −1( )γ .  
With a first-order Taylor approximation around e =1, we find that even marginal debt will 
decrease the cost of capital: 
WACC(e) ≈WACC(1)+ (1− e)λ <WACC(1) . 
If the company is fully debt financed, the debt beta becomes equal to the asset beta and Equation 
(3) reduces to that of the traditional WACC formula without the risk anomaly. This establishes 
that the optimum leverage must be an interior solution to equation (4). 
Observation 1: Firms will increase debt to minimize cost of capital. The first order 
condition cannot be satisfied if the debt beta is zero. At a zero debt beta, the left side of Equation 
(4) is positive. In other words, issuing more equity at the margin will raise the cost of capital. 
At first blush, this would seem to deepen the low leverage puzzle. One might ask why 
nonfinancial firms do not increase their leverage ratios further to take advantage of the risk 
anomaly: It is initially unclear how the low leverage ratios of nonfinancial firms represent an 
optimal tradeoff between the tax benefits of interest and the costs of financial distress, much less 
an extra benefit of debt arising from the mispricing of low risk stocks.  
The answer contained in Equation (4) is that many low leverage firms—e.g. the 
stereotypical unprofitable technology firm—already start with a high asset beta or overall asset 
risk. Their assets are already quite risky at zero debt. Even at modest levels of debt, meaningful 
amounts of risk are transferred from equity to debt. 
To further our understanding of optimal debt levels, a characterization of the dynamics 
underlying transfer of risk from equity to debt with increasing levels of leverage is necessary. A 
leading candidate for the functional form of debt betas is the Merton (1974) model. Merton uses 
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the isomorphic relationship between levered equity, a European call option, and the accounting 
identity  to derive the value of a single, homogenous debt claim, such that 
D(d,T ) = Be−rfτΦ x2 (d,T )[ ]+V 1−Φ x1(d,T )[ ]{ } ,   (5) 
where V is firm value with volatility σ, D is the value of the debt with maturity in τ  and face 
value B. Let T =σ 2τ  be the firm variance over time, and 
 
the debt ratio, where debt is 
valued at the risk free rate, thus d is an upward biased estimate of the actual market based debt 
ratio (Merton, pp. 454-455). Here, Φ(x)  is the cumulative standard normal distribution and x1 
and x2 are the familiar terms from the Black-Scholes formula. 
Following the approach of Black and Scholes (1973), we arrive at the debt beta 
. 
Here DV is the first derivative of the debt value given in Equation (5) with respect to firm value 
V. In the Merton model, the debt value is equivalent to a risk free debt claim less a put option. 
Using this property, it follows that the derivative DV is equivalent to the negative of the 
derivative of the value of this put option. That is, the derivative (or delta) of the put option on the 
underlying firm value is Δ put = − 1−Φ(x1)[ ] , thus Dv ≡ −Δ put =1−Φ(x1) . Substituting for 
Equation (5), the debt beta in the Merton model can be written as 
βd = βa
1−Φ(x1)
dΦ(x2 )+1−Φ(x1)
. (6) 
Further, we have that 
limd→0 βd = βa
1−Φ(x1)
dΦ(x2 )+1−Φ(x1)
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
= 0 , and 
D =V −E
d ≡ Be
−rfτ
V
βd = βa
V
D DV
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limd→∞ βd = βa
1−Φ(x1)
dΦ(x2 )+1−Φ(x1)
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
= βa , 
in line with the boundary conditions of the indenture of the debt and in support of the limiting 
conditions necessary to establish the claim of an interior optimum leverage. 
The factor  is equivalent to the Black-Scholes factor of an equity claim with spot 
price equal to firm value V and exercise price equal to face value of the debt claim B. In light 
thereof, the debt beta can be seen driven by the increasing value loss in bankruptcy. If βa > 0  
then the debt beta will be continuous and strictly increasing in d. Now rewriting Equation (6), 
, (7) 
and following the limits above it can be seen that . Consequently,  in 
Equation (7) can be interpreted as the conditional expectation of firm value given it is larger than 
the face value of debt, times the probability of the firm value being larger than the face value of 
debt. This is effectively the amount of firm risk carried by the debt.  
On closer inspection, the debt beta in Equation (6) can be written, showing its full 
functional dependence, . In our framework, however, the measure of leverage is not 
d, but rather the capital ratio, e, that is given by 
e(d,T ) = V −DV =Φ(x1)− dΦ(x2 ) . (8) 
By expressing the debt beta in Equation (6) parametrically as a function of the equity ratio in 
Equation (8) with d as a shared parameter, it can be shown that: 
∂βd (e,βa,T )
∂e < 0 ,	  
∂βd (e,βa,T )
∂βa
≥ 0 , and 
Φ(x1)
βd = βa
V −VΦ(x1)
D
0 ≤V −VΦ(x1) ≤ D VΦ(x1)
βd (d,βa,T )
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∂βd (e,βa,T )
∂βa∂e
< 0 .  (9) 
The first two partial derivatives of the debt beta with respect to the equity ratio and the asset beta 
follow directly from Equation (7) and the assumption thatβa > 0 . Furthermore, since the asset 
beta is simply a scalar and positive, the cross-partial derivative with the equity ratio must have 
the same sign as the partial derivative with respect to the equity ratio. 
We can now sign the change in the optimal capital ratio as a function of the underlying 
asset beta. Taking the derivative of e* with respect to the asset beta yields: 
de*(βa )
dβa
= − −
∂βd e*,βa( )
∂βa
+ 1− e*(βa )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
∂2βd e*,βa( )
∂e∂βa
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
×
 
−2 ∂βd e
*(βa ),βa( )
∂e + 1− e
*(βa )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
∂2βd e*(βa ),βa( )
∂e2
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
−1
. (10) 
If there is an interior optimum, the sign of Equation (10) is positive, and the optimal capital ratio 
is increasing in asset beta. The first term is positive using the signs of the partial derivatives in 
Equation (9). The second term is the second order condition at the optimal leverage ratio defined 
in Equation (4). This will be positive as long as there is an interior optimum and because the 
capital ratio is continuously differentiable.  
The last point to establish is that there is an interior optimum. We have already shown in 
Observation 1 that zero debt is not optimal. Zero equity is also not optimal. This is easy to see 
intuitively, though harder to establish analytically. The intuition is that, with the assumption of 
fairly priced debt, the firm will be fairly priced if it is funded entirely with debt, i.e. a leverage 
ratio of 100%. Can it increase value by shifting its leverage ratio down somewhat? Yes, this new 
equity, an out of the money call option, will be high risk, and hence overvalued. As a 
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consequence, neither 0% nor 100% are optimal, so the optimal leverage must be an interior 
optimum. An analytical argument to sign the second derivative in the Merton framework is 
provided in Appendix 1. The bottom line is that high asset beta firms carry less debt, when 
subjected to a risk anomaly, than do low asset beta firms. This is restated as Observation 2.  
Observation 2: The optimal leverage ratio is decreasing in asset beta. There is a 
simple intuition for this main result. Risk is overvalued in equity securities and fairly valued in 
debt securities. Ideally, to minimize the cost of capital, risk is concentrated in equity. This leads 
to the first result that firms will issue as much risk-free debt as possible. This lowers the WACC 
through an incommensurable increase in the cost of equity due to the increased risk. Once debt 
becomes risky, further increases in leverage have a cost. Shifting overvalued risk in equity 
securities to fairly valued risk in debt increases the cost of capital. For firms with high-risk 
assets, this increase is high even at low levels of leverage. For firms with very low risk assets, 
this increase remains low until leverage is high. 
B. Illustrations  
To keep things simple, we use the Black and Scholes (1973) assumptions and a single 
liquidation date, five years forward, with a contractual allocation of value between debt and 
equity and no costs of financial distress. For each level of leverage, we compute the value of 
debt, the value of equity, and the equity beta using the Merton model.  
Figure 3 shows the cost of capital and firm value as a function of leverage for a variety of 
asset risk levels. In the absence of a risk anomaly, cash flows both grow and are discounted at the 
CAPM rate, so firm value is the same at all asset risk levels. In the Figure we modify the value of 
equity using the risk anomaly in Equation (1) with an anomaly of 𝛾 = 5% per year, which is 
roughly the value we estimate.  
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The figure shows how an equity beta greater than one makes use of the anomaly and 
raises value. An equity beta less than one reduces value, and then some, in passing it up. Because 
the only effects here are through the weighted average cost of capital, with no cash flow effects, 
a weighted average cost of capital minimum in Panel A is equivalent to a firm value maximum in 
Panel B. Finally, under a risk anomaly, high asset risk means higher valuations at any level of 
leverage, Panel C removes this effect and shows value levels relative to the maximum for each 
level of asset risk. This panel shows that at least under these calibration parameters, failing to 
exploit the risk anomaly can lead to large losses in firm value. 
C. Predictions 
These figures illustrate the effects of a risk anomaly on capital structure choice and the 
main testable prediction: All else equal, leverage should be set inversely to asset beta.  
We restate the mechanism here. It is easiest to see in terms of extreme cases. First, low 
leverage firms that start with a high asset beta have only modest incentives to issue debt. Their 
high-risk equity is already highly valued. Although there may be a small additional amount of 
value to a bit of debt (the value maximum is not quite at zero leverage), even a small exogenous 
cost of accessing the debt markets could lead a firm to zero debt. Or, if managers of unlevered 
firms follow a simpler rule of thumb, executing a leveraged recapitalization (substituting equity 
for debt) only when equity is undervalued by the CAPM, they may also choose zero debt. 
This may help to explain a portion of the low leverage puzzle broached by Miller (1977) 
and clearly documented by Graham (2000). As an example, Linear Technology Corporation 
(Nasdaq: LLTC) produces semiconductors with a market capitalization of $7.7 billion as of 
December 2012. Despite profitable operations, a pre-interest marginal tax rate of 35% by the 
 20 
methodology in Graham and Mills (2008), and a cash balance of $1 billion, Linear maintains 
negative net debt. One explanation for this may be its high asset beta.  
While rarer than inexplicably low-leverage firms, a number of profitable firms maintain 
high leverage despite little tax benefit, tempting a fate of financial distress. An example is 
Textainer (NYSE: TGH), a firm that leases and trades marine cargo containers. As of the end of 
2012, its market capitalization was approximately $1.7 billion. It has tangible assets of $3.4 
billion and a cash balance of $175 million. Despite a marginal tax rate close to 0%, as a result of 
front-loaded depreciation, modest growth, and an offshore tax status, it maintains $2.7 billion in 
debt. A potential explanation for this failure of the standard tradeoff theory is the firm’s low 
asset beta. Equity is undervalued at low leverage, and its value rises steadily as leverage 
increases to its correct valuation, and potentially beyond.  
The risk anomaly tradeoff is also pertinent to a set of uniquely highly leveraged firms—
banks—which are often excluded from capital structure analyses. As Figure 3 shows, a risk 
anomaly in equities means that regulating low asset beta firms, in the sense of requiring them to 
delever significantly, can impose large losses in private value and increases in the cost of capital. 
As an example, Baker and Wurgler (2015) find that banks’ asset betas are on the order of 0.10, 
and that the risk anomaly within banks is at least as large as what we find for all firms. While 
there are numerous other forces at play in regulatory debates, the loss of the risk anomaly’s 
benefits provides one foundation for bankers’ common argument that reducing leverage would 
increase their cost of capital (e.g., Elliott (2013)). 
Although firms at the leverage extremes are not uncommon, and are particularly 
interesting here because they are where the standard tradeoff theory is least compelling, most 
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firms fall in between the extremes. Our regressions explore the extent to which the risk anomaly 
tradeoff, as captured through asset beta, can explain the middle of the cross-section as well.  
 
IV.  Empirical Tests  
A. Data 
Our main variables are introduced in Table 5. Our basic sample is the portion of the 
merged CRSP-Compustat sample for which marginal tax rates are available from John Graham. 
The data begin in 1980, when marginal tax rates are first available, and end in 2012. They 
contain 944,099 firm-months and span all 50 Fama-French (1995) industries. Unlike much 
capital structure research, we include financial firms because they can be incorporated in the risk 
anomaly theory (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2015)), but their exclusion does not affect the relevant 
results. In an average cross-section there are 2,120 profitable and 265 unprofitable firms.  
Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix 2. Gross book leverage is long-term debt 
and notes payable divided by the sum of long-term debt and notes payable plus book equity. Net 
book leverage nets out cash and equivalents from the numerator and denominator. Gross and net 
market leverage replace book equity with the market value of common equity from CRSP.  
The regressions control for traditional explanatory variables in Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 
(1984), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Frank and Goyal (2009), and 
others. The fixed assets ratio, a proxy for financial distress costs, is net property, plant and 
equipment divided by total assets. Profitability, which would be positively correlated with 
leverage under the standard tradeoff theory but inversely correlated under the Myers and Majluf 
(1984) pecking order, is EBIT divided by total assets. Market-to-book assets is known to be 
negatively related to leverage, consistent with the need for firms with strong growth 
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opportunities to avoid having to pass them up (Myers (1977)) or the outcome of equity market 
timing (Baker and Wurgler (2002)). It is gross debt and market equity divided by the sum of 
gross debt and book equity. Asset growth is more exploratory. It could be a proxy for growth 
opportunities, or it could capture size or the profitability that helps to make debt-financed 
acquisitions. Firm size, measured as the natural log of book assets, may also proxy for a variety 
of influences. Fama and French (1992) use it to represent the greater cash flow volatility of 
smaller firms and their higher expected costs of financial distress. It will also be correlated with 
their generally lesser access to debt markets. Finally, John Graham’s pre-interest marginal tax 
rates account for many features of the tax code. As shown by Graham and Mills (2008), they 
approximate the tax rates simulated with federal tax return data.  
The leverage determinants that interest us most are constructed from stock returns. Asset 
beta is unlevered equity beta, assuming debt is riskless. As we reported earlier, betas on 
corporate debt are very low, and in any case it is hard to do better without debt returns data. 
Total equity risk is the standard deviation of excess stock returns. Asset risk is the unlevered 
version. Industry asset beta and risk are market equity weighted averages.  
B. Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Tables 4 and 5 show summary statistics and correlations. Summary statistics on the 
standard capital structure determinants contain no surprises. Profitable firms are larger and have 
higher tax rates. Asset beta is somewhat higher for unprofitable firms, at least for own (firm-
specific) asset beta. Total risk is as well. With respect to asset risk, a firm must be promising and 
at least on a path to profitability to enter the CRSP-Compustat sample for the 24 months that we 
require to compute beta. Becoming unprofitable may be associated with unexpectedly negative 
 23 
returns; also, firms in variable industries are more likely to find themselves unprofitable in a 
given period. The latter logic also applies to beta, on the downside.  
The correlations in Table 5 contain a few insights, however. One is that gross and net 
leverage measures are loosely correlated enough to consider both as a robustness exercise. It is 
less important to consider both book and market leverage measures, given their 0.93 correlation, 
but we follow tradition and do so. The more interesting correlations are those between our risk 
measures and standard regression variables. In particular, asset beta risk is negatively correlated 
with tax rates, fixed assets, profitability, and size, and positively correlated with market-to-book 
and asset growth. Correlations are not transitive, but we will see, and prior research confirms, 
that several of these variables then have the opposite sign coefficients in leverage regressions. 
We will then need to ask whether the standard variables affect leverage because of an assortment 
of different theories, or because they are also picking up on a single force, asset beta risk. We 
return to this when we discuss the regressions. 
Table 6 looks more closely within profitable firms, where we have 839,350 observations 
and where the shortcomings of the standard tradeoff theory appear most clearly. The panels 
separate profitable firms into low leverage (gross book leverage <5%), medium leverage, and 
high leverage (gross book leverage >50%) groups. Zero leverage is obviously low, but what 
counts as high leverage is subjective. We obviously cannot expect a mode at 100%, which is 
insolvency, so we choose a cutoff of 50% for simplicity. The columns then add an additional sort 
into low (MTR<5%), medium, and high (MTR>30%) marginal tax rate groups.  
The low leverage puzzle is represented in the large number of firm-months with positive 
profitability, high marginal tax rates, and very low leverage. In fact, these make up 80% of all 
profitable, low leverage firms (=122,003/(7,236+23,936+122,003)). Firms like Linear 
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Technology are in this bin. Conversely, there are a number of firm-months where, despite almost 
no tax benefit, leverage exceeds 50%. These make up somewhat over 4% of all profitable high-
leverage firms (=8,407/(8,407+34,436+162,315)) and include firms like Textainer.  
Some initial support for the risk anomaly tradeoff comes from the strong differences in 
asset risk across the leverage levels, which is also essentially independent of tax rates. Within the 
middle tax rate group, for example, asset betas decline sharply with leverage. Firms with very 
low leverage have a median asset beta of 1.57. This falls to 0.92 for medium leverage firms and 
to 0.49 for high leverage firms. Also consistent with the risk anomaly tradeoff is the steady 
decline in asset risk. This, however, is somewhat less specific to the theory, as it could in 
principle just be another control for financial distress costs. We will, therefore, be more 
interested in the effect of asset beta controlling for total asset risk (also like Schwert and 
Strebulaev (2014)) in regressions. 
C. Regressions: Without Asset Risk 
The first column of Table 7 shows a baseline capital structure regression. We report 
marginal effects of Tobit regressions that cluster on both firm and month to improve standard 
errors. We choose gross book leverage for this baseline and include the typical empirical 
covariates. The first several variables’ signs and effects are consistent with prior research, as is 
the poor overall R2. The marginal tax rate has a positive coefficient, fixed assets a fairly strong 
positive coefficient, profitability a negative coefficient, market-to-book a negative coefficient, 
and size a positive coefficient. Rajan and Zingales (1995) focus on these four variables and 
obtain the same results. Finally, asset growth has a positive coefficient, rather inconsistent with it 
proxying for growth opportunities and more so with the interpretation that asset growth is a 
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consequence of the ability and desire to finance with debt, determined by other underlying 
sources, as opposed to a determinant of leverage in its own right.  
Each of these variables is often given a somewhat different interpretation. One is used to 
proxy for one effect, and another for another. Yet comparing the pattern of signs in this 
regression with the signs of correlations suggests an intriguing hypothesis: the standard variables 
may also be capturing the single force of asset beta. That is, we hypothesize that asset beta is 
negatively related to leverage, and each of these variables, with the exceptions of profitability 
and asset growth (where the theory is weaker, as well as the correlation with asset beta), has a 
regression coefficient that is the opposite sign to its correlation with asset beta. It is always hard 
to know exactly what these variables capture, but it is an interesting possibility that a common 
mechanism may contribute to their explanatory power.   
D. Regressions: Adding Asset Risk 
We now add risk measures to the standard regression determinants. Our special focus is 
on asset beta, which is what our theory suggests, but we also control for overall risk. In principle, 
any effect of total asset risk could reflect the risk anomaly tradeoff—some explanations of the 
risk anomaly are specific to beta, others are not. However, although it is not usually included in 
leverage regressions, with the recent exception of Schwert and Strebulaev (2014), total asset risk 
is also a plausible proxy for the expected costs of financial distress, especially compared to asset 
beta. Firms usually care more about going bankrupt at all than about precisely when it happens.  
The middle columns of Table 7 show that asset beta is a strong determinant of leverage, 
supporting the main prediction. This is true controlling for overall asset risk (as well as in a 
univariate regression). Adding the control variables does not significantly affect the coefficient 
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or t-statistic on asset beta. With all controls, a one-unit increase in asset beta reduces leverage by 
6.6%. (The economic effect of total asset risk is larger, though its interpretation is cloudy.)  
A problem with this exercise is the mechanical negative link between leverage and asset 
beta caused by using leverage itself to unlever the equity beta. One solution is to overcorrect and 
use unlevered equity beta and equity volatility. This creates a potential reverse causality that 
goes in the opposite direction from the predicted direction. Leverage, if chosen randomly, should 
be associated with higher equity betas and volatilities. However, if firms with higher asset risk 
choose lower leverage and firms with lower asset risk choose higher leverage in a way that does 
not fully equilibrate the betas, as the model predicts, then there will be on net a negative 
relationship between beta and leverage. In results available on request, we find that equity beta is 
also strongly negatively related to gross and net leverage in both book and market terms.  
Our preferred solution is to maintain focus on asset risk but eliminate any mechanical 
link by switching to industry measures. Although this likely introduces some measurement error, 
the last columns of Table 7 show that the economic effects remain robust to using industry risk. 
As a further robustness check, we consider alternative leverage measures in Table 8 that 
net out cash, substitute book value with market value equity, or both. We continue to use 
industry risk measures here. We find that the effects of asset beta on these leverage measures are 
as large or larger as the baseline gross book leverage specification.  
E. An Alternative Explanation   
It is clear that high asset beta is associated with lower leverage. This is consistent with 
the risk anomaly tradeoff whereby the cost of equity for high beta assets is lower and so less debt 
is optimal. The fact is also consistent with versions of the standard tradeoff theory, however. The 
costs of financial distress depend not only on the unconditional probability of default and value 
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lost in default but also when distress occurs and value is lost. If asset beta, holding all else 
constant, including total risk, dictates the market state when distress is likely to occur, then the 
present value of the costs of financial distress are higher for assets with higher systematic risk. In 
the lingo of asset pricing, it is the covariance of the stochastic discount factor with the costs of 
financial distress that determine the present value of distress costs.  
Almeida and Philippon (2007) argue that risk-adjustment increases the cost of financial 
distress. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) offer the tangible example of refinancing risk and fire sales. 
If refinancing risks and fire sale discounts are higher during market downturns, this would 
increase the value lost in distress and lower optimal leverage for firms with higher levels of 
systematic risk (though it is still hard to justify zero debt in the presence of large tax benefits). 
To distinguish further, we make use of a key difference between how risk matters in the 
traditional tradeoff and how it matters the risk anomaly tradeoff. In the traditional tradeoff, 
“downside risk” is the emphasis; risk matters because of bankruptcy costs. The risk anomaly 
model makes no such distinction. Hence, if a beta risk version of the traditional model drives the 
link between high asset beta and leverage, it should appear with more strength in downside risk.  
This is not the case. We estimate equity beta separately over months when the market risk 
premium was positive and when it was negative. Unlevering these and averaging by industry 
gives us an upside asset beta and downside asset beta measure. Table 9 shows that if anything, it 
is the upside component of asset beta that is inversely related to leverage. The downside 
component has no statistical association with leverage and a point estimate of the wrong sign to 
support a systematic risk version of the traditional tradeoff theory.    
In addition to an empirical advantage, the risk anomaly theory also has a conceptual 
advantage relating to its empirically grounded foundation. It is hard for the traditional tradeoff 
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theory, combined with rational asset pricing, to fit both the leverage and asset pricing evidence 
on the pricing of beta. If beta is truly a measure of risk, then it would help to explain the cross 
section of asset returns, which it does not. Investors, recognizing the investment opportunities, 
would demand higher returns on assets exposed to periods of fire sales. If beta is not truly a 
measure of risk—as the literature that follows Fama and French (1992, 1993) has claimed—then 
asset beta should not be a constraint on leverage, after controlling for total asset risk. The risk 
anomaly model naturally accommodates both leverage and asset pricing relationships. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 Since Modigliani and Miller, the academic literatures on asset pricing and corporate 
finance have grown separate. In particular, the corporate finance literature has largely taken the 
pricing of risk as given, because the overall cost of capital, and hence optimal capital structure, is 
unaffected under the seemingly plausible assumption that markets for different forms of 
securities are integrated.  
 Meanwhile, evidence in asset pricing indicates that high-risk equities do not earn 
commensurately high returns. This paper considers the possibility that this pattern reflects 
mispricing, driven by a mixture of behavioral and institutional frictions, and uses it to develop a 
tradeoff theory of leverage. For firms with relatively risky assets, the cost of capital is minimized 
at a low level of leverage. For firms with very low risk assets, low leverage entails a substantial 
cost in the form of issuing undervalued equity, and hence the cost of capital is minimized at 
much higher levels of leverage. Consistent with a risk anomaly, leverage is inversely related to 
systematic risk and may help to resolve both low and high leverage puzzles.  
 29 
References   
 
Almeida, Heitor, T. Philippon. “The Risk-Adjusted Cost of Financial Distress.” Journal of 
Finance 62 (2007), pp. 2557-2586.  
Ang, Andrew, R. Hodrick, Y. Xing, X. Zhang. “The Cross-Section of Volatility and Expected 
Returns.” Journal of Finance 61 (2006), pp. 259-299. 
Ang, Andrew, R. Hodrick, Y. Xing, X. Zhang. “High Idiosyncratic Volatility and Low Returns: 
International and Further U.S. Evidence.” Journal of Financial Economics 91 (2009), pp. 1-23. 
Baker, Malcolm, B. Bradley, R. Taliaferro. “The Risk Anomaly: A Decomposition into Micro 
and Macro Effects.” Harvard Business School, working paper (2013).  
Baker, Malcolm, B. Bradley, J. Wurgler. “Benchmarks as Limits to Arbitrage: Understanding the 
Low-Volatility Anomaly.” Financial Analysts Journal 67 (2011), pp. 40-54.  
Baker, Malcolm, J. Wurgler. “Do Strict Capital Requirements Raise the Cost of Capital? Bank 
Regulation, Capital Structure, and the Risk Anomaly.” American Economic Review 105 (2015), 
pp. 315-320.  
Baker, Malcolm, J. Wurgler. “Comovement and Predictability Relationships Between Bonds and 
the Cross-Section of Stocks.” Review of Asset Pricing Studies 2 (2012), pp. 57-87. 
Bali, Turan, N. Cakici, R. Whitelaw. “Maxing Out: Stocks as Lotteries and the Cross-Section of 
Expected Returns.” Journal of Financial Economics 99 (2011), pp. 427-446. 
Barberis, Nicholas, A. Shleifer. “Style Investing.” Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2003), pp. 
161-199. 
Barberis, Nicholas, M. Huang. “Stocks as Lotteries: The Implications of Probability Weighting 
for Security Prices.” American Economic Review 98 (2008), pp. 2066-2100. 
Black, Fischer. “Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing.” Journal of Business 45 
(1972), pp. 444-455. 
Black, Fischer, M. C. Jensen, M. Scholes. “The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Empirical 
Tests.” In M. C. Jensen, ed., Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets. New York: Praeger 
(1972), pp. 79-121. 
Black, Fischer, Myron Scholes, “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities.” Journal of 
Political Economy 81 (1973), pp 637-659. 
Blitz, David, P. V. Vliet. “The Volatility Effect: Lower Risk Without Lower Return.” Journal of 
Portfolio Management 34 (2007), pp. 102-113. 
 30 
Blitz, David, J. Pang, P. V. Vliet. “The Volatility Effect in Emerging Markets.” Emerging 
Markets Review 16 (2013), pp. 31-45. 
Bradley, Michael, G. Jarrell, E. H. Kim. “On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: 
Theory and Evidence.” Journal of Finance 39 (1984), pp. 857-878. 
Brennan, Michael. “Agency and Asset Pricing.” University of California, Los Angeles, working 
paper (1993). 
Cornell, Bradford. “The Pricing of Volatility and Skewness: A New Interpretation.” California 
Institute of Technology working paper (2008). 
Elliott, Douglas J. “Higher Bank Capital Requirements Would Come at a Price.” Brookings 
Institute Internet posting. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/02/20-bank-capital-
requirements-elliott (February 20, 2013). 
Falkenstein, Eric. Mutual Funds, Idiosyncratic Variance, and Asset Returns. PhD thesis (1994), 
Northwestern University. 
Fama, Eugene, K. R. French. “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns.” Journal of 
Finance 47 (1992), pp. 427-465. 
Fama, Eugene, K. R. French. “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds.” 
Journal of Financial Economics 33 (1993), pp. 3-56. 
Fama, Eugene, K. R. French. “Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About 
Dividends and Debt.” Review of Financial Studies 15 (2002), pp. 1-33. 
Frank, Murray Z., V. K. Goyal, “Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors Are Reliably 
Important?” Financial Management 38 (2009), pp. 1-37. 
Frazzini, Andrea, L. H. Pedersen. “Betting Against Beta.” Journal of Financial Economics 111 
(2014), pp. 1-25. 
Gibbons, Michael R., S. A. Ross, J. Shanken. “A Test of the Efficiency of a Given Portfolio.” 
Econometrica 57 (1989), pp. 1121-1152. 
Gornall, Will, I. A. Strebulaev. “Financing as a Supply Chain: The Capital Structure of Banks 
and Borrowers.” Stanford Graduate School of Business working paper (2014).   
Graham, John, “How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt.” Journal of Finance 63 (2000), pp. 1901-
1941. 
Graham, John, and L. Mills. “Simulating Marginal Tax Rates Using Tax Return Data.” Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 46 (2008), pp. 366-388. 
 31 
Harris, Milton, and A. Raviv. “The Theory of Capital Structure.” Journal of Finance 46 (1991), 
pp. 297-355. 
Haugen, Robert A., A. J. Heins, “Risk and the Rate of Return on Financial Assets: Some Old 
Wine in New Bottles.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 10 (1975), pp. 775-784. 
Hong, Harrison, D. Sraer. “Speculative Betas.” Princeton University working paper (2012).  
Ibbotson Associates, 2012, Ibbotson SBBI 2012 Classic Yearbook (Morningstar, Chicago).  
Karceski, Jason. “Returns-Chasing Behavior, Mutual Funds, and Beta’s Death. “ Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37 (2002), pp. 559-594. 
Kumar, Alok. “Who Gambles in the Stock Market?” Journal of Finance 64 (2009), pp. 1889-1933.  
Merton, Robert C. “On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates.” 
Journal of Finance 29 (1974), pp. 449–470. 
Miller, Merton H., “Debt and Taxes.” Journal of Finance 32, pp. 261-275. 
Myers, Stewart, N. Majluf. “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have 
Information That Investors Do Not Have.” Journal of Financial Economics 13 (1984), pp. 187-
221. 
 
Myers, Stewart. “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing.” Journal of Financial Economics 5 
(1977), pp. 147-175. 
 
Rajan, Raghuram, and L. Zingales. “What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some 
Evidence from International Data.” Journal of Finance 50 (1995), pp. 1421-1460. 
 
Schwert, Michael, I. A. Strebulaev. “Capital Structure and Systematic Risk.” Stanford University 
working paper (2014).  
 
Shleifer, Andrei, and R. Vishny. “Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium 
Approach.” Journal of Finance 47 (1992), pp. 1343-1366. 
 
Stein, Jeremy, “Rational Capital Budgeting in an Irrational World.” Journal of Business 69 
(1996), pp 429-455. 
 
 32 
 
Figure 1. Segmented Debt and Equity Markets. For the risk anomaly to impact the weighted average cost of 
capital, debt and equity markets must be segmented. Panel A shows a risk anomaly that extends across asset classes, 
e.g. from safe debt with very low beta to equity with higher beta, rendering capital structure irrelevant. Panels B and 
C show segmented debt and equity markets, first with debt correctly priced and then with a small risk anomaly. 
Panel A. Integrated Debt and Equity Markets Panel B. Markets Not Integrated, Debt Correctly Priced 
  
 
 Panel C. Markets Not Integrated, Small Low Risk   
Anomaly in Debt Markets 
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Figure 2. Bond Returns and the Risk Anomaly in Stocks. Plots of average returns and CAPM betas for three 
value weighted equity portfolios sorted into quintiles using pre-ranking betas as well as long-term corporate and 
government bonds from Ibbotson and Associates. The returns and betas are estimated as in Tables 1 and 2. An 
empirical security market line is fit through the three equity data points. 
Panel A. 1968-2012 
 
Panel B. 1931-2012 
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Figure 3. Value Effects of Leverage When There is a Risk Anomaly in Equities. We compute firm value for 
firms with five different levels of asset beta. Each firm has a normally distributed terminal value five years hence, 
with a contractual distribution of value between debt and equity and no costs of financial distress or tax effects. The 
value of each firm would be exactly $10, regardless of leverage, if there were no low-risk anomaly. Volatility is 
equal to asset beta times the sum of a market volatility of 16% plus an idiosyncratic firm volatility of 20%. The risk 
free rate is 2%. We compute the value of equity, the value of debt, and the equity beta under the Merton model with 
no risk anomaly. We compound this equity value using the CAPM expected return with a market risk premium of 
8% over five years, and then present value this future equity value using the discount rate from Equation (1) with a γ 
of 5%. This is the adjusted equity value. The weighted average cost of capital uses the adjusted equity value and the 
value of debt as weights, the cost of equity from Equation (1), and the CAPM expected return for debt. Firm value is 
the adjusted equity value plus the value of debt. Leverage is computed using these market values. 
 
 
Panel A. Weighted Average Cost of Capital Panel B. Absolute Firm Value 
 
  
 
 
Panel C. Firm Value Relative to the Maximum 
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Table 1. Realized Returns and Risk: Beta Portfolios, 1968-2012. Regressions of portfolio returns on market 
excess returns and the Fama-French factors, SMB and HML. Each portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate 
is computed using either equal or value weights. The sample is divided within each month into low (bottom 30%), 
medium (middle 40%), and high (top 30%) portfolios according to pre-ranking beta. Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken 
(1989) tests are shown for each set of regressions. 
 
Panel A. Equal Weighted 
 Bottom 30% Middle 40% Top 30% Top – Bottom 
Basis Points Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] 
Mean Excess Returns 
 71.4 [3.99] 80.5 [3.35] 73.7 [2.16] 2.2 [0.11] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 0.69 [25.70] 1.06 [36.65] 1.44 [31.71] 0.74 [24.39] 
Intercept 41.1 [3.41] 34.3 [2.66] 11.1 [0.55] -30.1 [-2.22] 
T  540  540  540  540 
R-Squared  0.551  0.714  0.651  0.525 
GRS Test (p)   9.10 (<0.01)     
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 0.66 [33.64] 0.99 [62.11] 1.32 [45.02] 0.66 [25.24] 
SMB 0.53 [18.62] 0.71 [30.97] 0.99 [23.58] 0.46 [12.46] 
HML 0.31 [10.22] 0.40 [16.35] 0.32 [7.00] 0.01 [0.15] 
Intercept 25.4 [2.92] 15.1 [2.16] -3.4 [-0.26] -28.8 [-2.51] 
T  540  540  540  540 
R-Squared  0.778  0.919  0.864  0.674 
GRS Test (p)   5.18 (<0.01)     
Panel B. Value Weighted 
 Bottom 30% Middle 40% Top 30% Top – Bottom 
Basis Points Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] 
Mean Excess Returns 
 46.2 [2.99] 45.0 [2.26] 38.6 [1.32] -7.5 [-0.37] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 0.71 [42.46] 1.02 [130.49] 1.42 [59.04] 0.72 [21.11] 
Intercept 15.3 [2.05] 0.4 [0.12] -23.4 [-2.18] -38.7 [-2.56] 
T  540  540  540  540 
R-Squared  0.770  0.969  0.866  0.453 
GRS Test (p)   2.76 (0.04)     
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 0.70 [40.73] 0.99 [93.84] 1.34 [69.41] 0.64 [20.04] 
SMB 0.00 [0.19] 0.00 [-0.02] 0.26 [9.46] 0.26 [5.62] 
HML 0.15 [5.68] 0.10 [6.19] -0.01 [-0.47] -0.16 [-3.35] 
Intercept 8.5 [1.12] -2.6 [-0.56] -20.1 [-2.36] -28.6 [-2.03] 
T  540  540  540  540 
R-Squared  0.771  0.948  0.920  0.545 
GRS Test (p)   2.71 (0.04)     
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Table 2. Realized Returns and Risk: Beta Portfolios, 1931-2012. Regressions of portfolio returns on market 
excess returns and the Fama-French factors, SMB and HML. Each portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate 
is computed using either equal or value weights. The sample is divided within each month into low (bottom 30%), 
medium (middle 40%), and high (top 30%) portfolios according to pre-ranking beta. Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken 
(1989) tests are shown for each set of regressions. 
 
Panel A. Equal Weighted 
 Bottom 30% Middle 40% Top 30% Top – Bottom 
Basis Points Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] 
Mean Excess Returns 
 94.8 [5.86] 113.3 [4.86] 121.9 [3.83] 27.2 [1.50] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 0.82 [51.44] 1.25 [66.71] 1.64 [56.29] 0.83 [38.31] 
Intercept 42.3 [4.98] 33.1 [3.31] 16.2 [1.04] -26.0 [-2.25] 
T  984  984  984  984 
R-Squared  0.729  0.819  0.763  0.599 
GRS Test (p)   13.55 (<0.01)     
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 0.68 [57.77] 1.03 [113.58] 1.35 [82.39] 0.66 [36.81] 
SMB 0.50 [26.16] 0.71 [48.72] 1.06 [40.47] 0.57 [19.52] 
HML 0.21 [12.47] 0.40 [30.73] 0.53 [22.33] 0.31 [12.06] 
Intercept 29.3 [4.93] 11.1 [2.44] -14.5 [-1.76] -43.8 [-4.82] 
T  984  984  984  984 
R-Squared  0.869  0.963  0.935  0.756 
GRS Test (p)   11.36 (<0.01)     
Panel B. Value Weighted 
 Bottom 30% Middle 40% Top 30% Top – Bottom 
Basis Points Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] 
Mean Excess Returns 
 59.7 [4.51] 71.3 [3.79] 76.3 [2.81] 16.6 [0.95] 
CAPM Regressions 
Market 0.73 [80.18] 1.10 [186.67] 1.53 [97.94] 0.80 [38.31] 
Intercept 12.9 [2.66] 0.8 [0.25] -21.9 [-2.62] -34.8 [-3.12] 
T  984  984  984  984 
R-Squared  0.868  0.973  0.907  0.599 
GRS Test (p)   4.22 (<0.01)     
Fama-French 3-Factor Regressions 
Market 0.72 [72.45] 1.05 [149.40] 1.42 [105.24] 0.71 [34.80] 
SMB -0.05 [-2.89] 0.02 [1.37] 0.29 [13.51] 0.34 [10.38] 
HML 0.05 [3.83] 0.12 [11.59] 0.21 [10.60] 0.15 [5.19] 
Intercept 11.8 [2.37] -3.0 [-0.84] -32.4 [-4.75] -44.1 [-4.31] 
T  984  984  984  984 
R-Squared  0.863  0.966  0.939  0.668 
GRS Test (p)   8.25 (<0.01)     
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Table 3. Debt and Equity Market Segmentation. Regressions of portfolio returns on market excess returns and 
government bond excess returns. Each portfolio total return in excess of the riskless rate is computed using value 
weights. The sample is divided within each month into low (bottom 30%), medium (middle 40%), and high (top 
30%) portfolios according to pre-ranking beta, using all CRSP stocks. We also compute the returns to corporate 
bonds in excess of the riskless rate using data from Ibbotson and Associates. Below we show the market beta, 
government bond beta, and the alpha (or intercept) for the Bottom 30% portfolio in absolute terms and for the Top 
30% portfolio and corporate bonds in relation to the Bottom 30%. The final column compares the extrapolated alpha 
using the relationship between alpha and beta in the Bottom and Top 30% portfolios to the actual alpha for corporate 
bonds. In an integrated market, where the low beta anomaly holds equally in stock and bond markets, the actual and 
extrapolated betas are the same. There are 540 months in the first two panels and 984 in the second two panels. 
 
 
Bottom 30% Top - Bottom 30% 
Corporate –  
Bottom 30% 
Extrapolated 
Corporate –  
Bottom 30% 
Basis Points Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [prob] 
CAPM Regressions, January 1968-December 2012 
Market 0.67 [36.32] 0.72 [27.57] -0.51 [-19.56]   
Intercept 17.0 [1.97] -38.8 [-3.18] 5.1 [0.42] 27.6  
Difference       -22.4 [p =0.104] 
R-Squared        0.8198 
CAPM Regressions with Government Bond Returns, January 1968-December 2012 
Market 0.66 [44.54] 0.75 [36.04] -0.57 [-27.24]   
Bonds 0.16 [7.42] -0.32 [-10.29] 0.60 [19.27]   
Intercept 12.9 [1.89] -30.9 [-3.19] -9.8 [-1.01] 23.3  
Difference       -33.1 [p =0.014] 
R-Squared        0.888 
CAPM Regressions, January 1931-December 2012 
Market 0.71 [63.79] 0.80 [50.64] -0.63 [-39.63]   
Intercept 13.6 [2.24] -35.1 [-4.09] 3.8 [0.45] 27.5  
Difference       -23.6 [p =0.036] 
R-Squared        0.8899 
CAPM Regressions with Government Bond Returns, January 1931-December 2012 
Market 0.71 [72.54] 0.82 [59.57] -0.66 [-47.66]   
Bonds 0.17 [8.01] -0.36 [-11.86] 0.57 [18.83]   
Intercept 10.7 [2.03] -28.9 [-3.89] -6.0 [-0.80] 23.1  
Difference       -29.1 [p =0.006] 
R-Squared        0.9179 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics: CRSP Data and Compustat Data. Leverage ratios, asset beta and risk, and capital 
structure determinants, 1980-2012. We divide firms into profitable and unprofitable. A firm is defined as profitable 
if it has earnings before interest and taxes (Compustat = EBITDA) greater than zero. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix 2. There are 944,099 observations in 50 industries across 396 months. 
 
 Profitable Firms Unprofitable Firms 
 Avg N Mean SD Avg N Mean SD 
Book Leverage, Gross (%) 2,120 32.9 25.8 265 30.5 33.7 
Book Leverage, Net (%) 2,120 27.0 24.7 265 21.7 25.9 
Market Leverage, Gross (%) 2,120 21.5 33.6 265 13.4 42.4 
Market Leverage, Net (%) 2,120 18.7 29.3 265 9.2 31.6 
Asset Beta 2,120 0.90 0.75 265 1.24 1.28 
Asset Risk (%) 2,120 11.2 9.0 265 23.4 17.8 
FF Industry Asset Beta 2,120 0.87 0.33 265 0.95 0.36 
FF Industry Asset Risk (%) 2,120 7.5 2.9 265 8.6 3.3 
Pre-Interest, Marginal Tax Rate (%)  2,120 33.5 10.3 265 14.1 14.0 
Fixed Assets Ratio (%) 2,120 32.6 23.6 265 24.4 22.4 
Profitability (%) 2,120 9.7 7.6 265 -21.8 21.2 
Market-to-Book Assets 2,120 1.9 1.9 265 3.2 4.1 
Log(Assets) 2,120 5.7 2.2 265 3.4 1.8 
Asset Growth (%) 2,120 14.1 30.7 265 3.7 48.3 
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Table 5. Correlations: CRSP Data and Compustat Data. Leverage ratios, asset beta and risk, and capital 
structure determinants, 1980-2012. Variable definitions are in Appendix 2. There are 944,099 observations in 50 
industries across 396 months. 
 
Panel A. Leverage Measures 
 Book Leverage Market Leverage 
 Gross Net Gross Net 
Book Leverage, Gross (%) 1.00    
Book Leverage, Net (%) 0.78 1.00   
Market Leverage, Gross (%) 0.93 0.76 1.00  
Market Leverage, Net (%) 0.78 0.93 0.86 1.00 
 
 
Panel B. Leverage Determinants 
 
Own Asset Risk 
FF Industry  
Asset Risk 
 Beta RMSE Beta RMSE 
Asset Beta 1.00    
Asset Risk (%) 0.61 1.00   
FF Industry Asset Beta 0.31 0.26 1.00  
FF Industry Asset Risk (%) 0.24 0.32 0.81 1.00 
Pre-Int. Mgl. Tax Rate (%)  -0.09 -0.34 -0.08 -0.13 
Fixed Assets Ratio (%) -0.21 -0.24 -0.25 -0.24 
Profitability (%) -0.06 -0.30 -0.05 -0.08 
Market-to-Book Assets 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.16 
Log(Assets) -0.06 -0.40 -0.15 -0.14 
Asset Growth (%) 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 
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Table 6. Summary Statistics for Profitable Firms: CRSP Data and Compustat Data. Leverage ratios, asset beta 
and risk, and capital structure determinants, 1980-2012. We divide the sample of profitable CRSP-Computstat firms 
into six groups, according to gross book leverage (in Panels A through C) and according to pre-interest marginal tax 
rate (across three pairs of columns). A firm is defined as profitable if it has earnings before interest and taxes 
(Compustat = EBITDA) greater than zero. The marginal tax rate is from John Graham, computed using the 
methodology of Graham and Mills (2008). Variable definitions are in Appendix 2. There are 839,350 observations 
in 50 industries across 396 months. 
 
 Tax Rates 
 N MTR<5% N Middle N MTR>30% 
Panel A. Low Leverage, <5% Gross Book Leverage 
Book Leverage, Gross (%) 7,236 0.8 23,936 0.9 122,003 1.0 
Book Leverage, Net (%) 7,236 0.7 23,936 0.8 122,003 0.7 
Market Leverage, Gross (%) 7,236 -20.3 23,936 -19.8 122,003 -20.0 
Market Leverage, Net (%) 7,236 -15.8 23,936 -16.9 122,003 -13.8 
Asset Beta 7,236 1.68 23,936 1.57 122,003 1.34 
FF Industry Asset Beta 7,236 1.03 23,936 1.02 122,003 0.99 
Asset Risk (%) 7,236 27.7 23,936 25.5 122,003 17.1 
FF Industry Asset Risk (%) 7,236 9.3 23,936 9.2 122,003 8.7 
Pre-Interest, Marginal Tax Rate  (%) 7,236 1.8 23,936 17.8 122,003 36.7 
Fixed Assets Ratio (%) 7,236 21.9 23,936 21.8 122,003 22.0 
Profitability (%) 7,236 5.0 23,936 6.5 122,003 14.7 
Market-to-Book Assets 7,236 3.1 23,936 2.2 122,003 3.1 
Panel B. Medium Leverage 
Book Leverage, Gross (%) 14,902 26.6 69,309 27.6 447,378 28.1 
Book Leverage, Net (%) 14,902 24.5 69,309 26.7 447,378 23.0 
Market Leverage, Gross (%) 14,902 13.3 69,309 15.7 447,378 17.1 
Market Leverage, Net (%) 14,902 14.5 69,309 16.6 447,378 15.3 
Asset Beta 14,902 0.96 69,309 0.92 447,378 0.91 
FF Industry Asset Beta 14,902 0.96 69,309 0.90 447,378 0.86 
Asset Risk (%) 14,902 16.9 69,309 14.5 447,378 10.2 
FF Industry Asset Risk (%) 14,902 8.7 69,309 8.1 447,378 7.5 
Pre-Interest, Marginal Tax Rate  (%) 14,902 2.2 69,309 18.1 447,378 37.7 
Fixed Assets Ratio (%) 14,902 33.5 69,309 34.8 447,378 34.3 
Profitability (%) 14,902 3.2 69,309 5.0 447,378 10.7 
Market-to-Book Assets 14,902 2.1 69,309 1.6 447,378 1.9 
Panel C. High Leverage, >50% Gross Book Leverage 
Book Leverage, Gross (%) 8,407 76.5 34,436 74.9 162,315 68.1 
Book Leverage, Net (%) 8,407 57.3 34,436 58.2 162,315 55.1 
Market Leverage, Gross (%) 8,407 72.0 34,436 70.6 162,315 63.5 
Market Leverage, Net (%) 8,407 53.8 34,436 54.3 162,315 51.2 
Asset Beta 8,407 0.49 34,436 0.49 162,315 0.51 
FF Industry Asset Beta 8,407 0.82 34,436 0.81 162,315 0.76 
Asset Risk (%) 8,407 9.1 34,436 8.3 162,315 6.3 
FF Industry Asset Risk (%) 8,407 7.4 34,436 7.3 162,315 6.7 
Pre-Interest, Marginal Tax Rate  (%) 8,407 2.1 34,436 17.9 162,315 37.2 
Fixed Assets Ratio (%) 8,407 38.1 34,436 37.4 162,315 35.4 
Profitability (%) 8,407 1.9 34,436 4.1 162,315 7.7 
Market-to-Book Assets 8,407 2.0 34,436 1.8 162,315 1.6 
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Table 7. Capital Structure and Asset Risk, 1980-2012. Tobit regressions of gross book leverage on capital 
structure determinants. Gross leverage ratio is defined as long-term debt (DLTT) plus notes payable (NP) divided by 
long-term debt plus notes payable plus book equity. Book equity is computed in the same way as in Ken French’s 
data library. Regressions labeled “Own Risk Measures” use firm measures of asset beta and asset risk. Regressions 
labeled “Industry Risk Measures” use matched Fama-French industry measures of asset beta and asset risk. Other 
variable definitions are in Appendix 2. 
 
 Base Own Risk Measures Industry Risk Measures 
 Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] 
Asset Beta   -7.39 [-13.35] -6.57 [-11.20] -10.95 [-4.27] -6.01 [-2.12] 
Asset Risk (%)   -0.86 [-15.56] -0.92 [-15.28] -1.08 [-3.51] -0.98 [-2.90] 
Pre-Interest 
Marginal Tax Rate (%) 0.10 [2.05]   -0.07 [-1.88]   0.07 [1.45] 
Fixed Assets Ratio (%) 0.19 [3.96]   0.08 [2.17]   0.14 [3.46] 
Profitability (%) -0.39 [-8.15]   -0.47 [-11.7]   -0.39 [-7.96] 
Market-to-Book Assets -1.29 [-5.52]   -0.54 [-2.10]   -1.07 [-5.07] 
Log Assets 2.85 [8.66]   1.53 [5.52]   2.63 [9.77] 
Asset Growth (%) 0.04 [4.07]   0.06 [8.78]   0.04 [4.27] 
Two-Way Clustering  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
   Industries  50  50  50  50  50 
   Months  396  396  396  396  396 
N (000)  944  944  944  944  944 
OLS R2  0.09  0.18  0.24  0.05  0.11 
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Table 8. Alternate Leverage Ratios, 1980-2012. Tobit regressions of leverage on capital structure determinants. 
We repeat the final regression of Table 7 using four different measures of leverage. Net leverage ratios deduct cash 
and equivalents from debt. Market leverage ratios replace book equity with market capitalization, equal to price 
times shares outstanding from CRSP. 
 
 Gross Leverage (%) Net Leverage (%) 
 Book Market Book Market 
 Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] 
FF Industry Asset Beta -6.01 [-2.12] -9.17 [-3.41] -9.26 [-2.13] -11.65 [-3.10] 
FF Industry Asset Risk (%) -0.98 [-2.9] -0.62 [-1.93] -1.48 [-3.13] -1.01 [-2.45] 
Pre-Interest 
Marginal Tax Rate (%) 0.07 [1.45] 0.10 [2.68] 0.12 [1.82] 0.15 [3.07] 
Fixed Assets Ratio (%) 0.14 [3.46] 0.11 [2.89] 0.28 [5.23] 0.22 [4.76] 
Profitability (%) -0.39 [-7.96] -0.39 [-7.21] -0.43 [-7.21] -0.43 [-6.88] 
Market-to-Book Assets -1.07 [-5.07] -4.35 [-12.43] -2.26 [-6.38] -5.71 [-14.6] 
Log Assets 2.63 [9.77] 2.09 [8.64] 2.69 [7.13] 2.24 [7.22] 
Asset Growth (%) 0.04 [4.27] 0.02 [3.05] 0.03 [2.10] 0.02 [1.62] 
Two-Way Clustering  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
   Industries  50  50  50  50 
   Months  396  396  396  396 
N (000)  944  944  944  944 
OLS R2  0.11  0.24  0.15  0.19 
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Table 9. Upside and Downside Beta, 1980-2012. Tobit regressions of leverage on capital structure determinants. 
We repeat the third regression of Table 7 using four different measures of leverage and upside and downside beta in 
place of beta. Net leverage ratios deduct cash and equivalents from debt. Market leverage ratios replace book equity 
with market capitalization, equal to price times shares outstanding from CRSP. 
 
 Gross Leverage (%) Net Leverage (%) 
 Book Market Book Market 
 Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] Coef [t] 
Upside FF Industry Asset Beta -3.65 [-2.70] -4.41 [-3.66] -5.44 [-2.69] -5.94 [-3.38] 
Downside FF Industry Asset Beta 2.04 [0.97] 0.62 [0.36] 2.21 [0.74] 0.72 [0.30] 
FF Industry Asset Risk (%) -1.41 [-5.03] -1.17 [-4.67] -2.08 [-5.29] -1.67 [-5.14] 
Two-Way Clustering  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
   Industries  50  50  50  50 
   Months  396  396  396  396 
N (000)  944  944  944  944 
OLS R2  0.11  0.24  0.15  0.19 
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Appendix 1. Leverage has an Interior Optimum. 
We can show more formally that the second-order condition holds. This requires the debt 
beta be convex in the equity ratio, or 
∂2βd (e,βa,T )
∂e(d,T )2 ≥ 0 .	  
For the following steps, let us consider the debt ratio, 	  
δ(d,T ) =1− e(d,T ) =1−Φ(x1)+ dΦ(x2 ) , (A1) 
which is continuous and strictly increasing in d. Let b be an arbitrary positive number, then from 
Theorem 1 in Cargo (1965) it follows that if the debt beta and the debt ratio in Equation (6) and 
(A1) are continuous, strictly increasing functions on the interval d ∈ (0,b) , then the debt beta is 
convex with respect to the debt ratio if and only if 
∂βd (d,βa,T ) /∂d
∂δ(d,T ) /∂d = βa
Φ(x2 )φ(x1)
σ τ
+ 1−Φ(x1)[ ]φ(x2 )
σ τ
+Φ(x1)Φ(x2 )−Φ(x2 )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
1−Φ(x1)+ dΦ(x2 )[ ]2 Φ(x2 )− φ(x2 )
σ τ
+
φ(x1)
dσ τ
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
 
is non-decreasing on (0,b). That is, 
∂2βd (d,βa,T )
∂[δ(d,T )]2 ≥ 0 . 
We can establish that this is convex over all levels of capital, provided that the level of volatility 
τσ  is not extreme. This establishes that the debt beta is convex in the equity ratio and that 
Equation (10) is at least in general positive. 
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Appendix 2. Variable Definitions. All variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99% as measured 
across the whole sample. 
 
Asset Beta Beta times one minus net market leverage.  
Asset Growth The annual change in total assets (AT) divided by total assets one year ago, in 
percentage terms. 
Asset Risk (%) Risk times one minus market leverage, net. 
Beta Market beta computed from CRSP returns (RET) net of Treasury bill returns (YLDMAT) 
from CRSP regressed on the value-weighted market return (VWRET), also net of the 
Treasury bill return. We require at least 24 months of returns and use at most 60 months 
of returns. 
Book Equity Shareholder’s equity minus preferred stock plus deferred taxes. Shareholder’s 
equity (SEQ) or the sum of common equity (CEQ) plus preferred stock (PSTK) if 
shareholder’s equity is missing or total assets (AT) minus total liabilities (LT) if common 
equity is missing. Preferred stock is equal to the redemption value of preferred stock 
(PSTKRV) or the liquidating value of preferred stock (PSTKL) or total preferred stock 
(PSTK) in that order and set to zero if still missing. Deferred taxes are equal to deferred 
tax and investment tax credit (TXDITC) or balance sheet deferred tax (TXDB) in that 
order and zero if missing. 
Book Leverage, Gross (%) The sum of total long-term debt (COMPUSTAT = DLTT) and notes 
payable (NP) divided by the sum of total long-term debt and notes payable and book 
equity, in percentage terms. 
Book Leverage, Net (%) The sum of total long-term debt (COMPUSTAT = DLTT) and notes 
payable (NP) less cash and equivalents (CHE) divided by the sum of total long-term debt 
and notes payable and book equity less cash and equivalents, in percentage terms. 
FF Industry Asset Beta Market equity weighted average asset beta, computed for each Fama-
French industry classification. Market equity is equal to price (PRC) times shares 
outstanding (CRSP) from CRSP. The 49 industry classifications are defined in Ken 
French’s data library. 
FF Industry Asset Risk (%) Market equity weighted average asset risk, computed for each 
Fama-French industry classification. Market equity is equal to price (PRC) times shares 
outstanding (CRSP) from CRSP. The 49 industry classifications are defined in Ken 
French’s data library. 
Fixed Assets Ratio (%) Plant, property, and equipment, net (PPENT) divided by total assets 
(AT), in percentage terms.  
Log Assets The natural log of total assets (AT). 
Market-to-Book Assets Sum of total long-term debt (COMPUSTAT = DLTT) and notes 
payable (NP) and market equity divided by the sum of total long-term debt and notes 
payable and book equity. Market equity is equal to price (PRC) times shares outstanding 
(CRSP) from CRSP. 
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Market Leverage, Gross (%) The sum of total long-term debt (COMPUSTAT = DLTT) and 
notes payable (NP) divided by the sum of total long-term debt and notes payable and 
market equity. Market equity is equal to price (PRC) times shares outstanding (CRSP) 
from CRSP, in percentage terms. 
Market Leverage, Net (%) The sum of total long-term debt (COMPUSTAT = DLTT) and notes 
payable (NP) less cash and equivalents (CHE) divided by the sum of total long-term debt 
and notes payable and market equity less cash and equivalents. Market equity is equal to 
price (PRC) times shares outstanding (CRSP) from CRSP, in percentage terms. 
Pre-Interest, Marginal Tax Rate (%) John Graham provided estimates of the pre-interest 
marginal tax rate, computed using the methodology of Graham and Mills (2008), in 
percentage terms. 
Profitability (%) Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by assets (AT), in 
percentage terms. 
Risk (%) Standard deviation of CRSP returns (RET) net of Treasury bill returns (YLDMAT), in 
percentage terms. 
